We show that across developing countries, external debt to private creditors rises more than proportionately with income. We then develop a simple theoretical model consistent with this phenomenon and also consistent with the well-documented relationship between capital market development and growth. Our framework stresses information asymmetries at the level of individual borrowers as the source of frictions in world capital markets.
I. Introduction
The standard neoclassical model of trade and growth predicts that rich-country savers will lend to investors in high-marginal-product-of-capital poor countries. After the deregulation of international capital markets in the 19608, the 1970s indeed witnessed a broad expansion of lending from industrialized countries to the developing world. However, for certain features of the data, the standard model does not seem to provide the simplest explanation. For example, during the 1970s middle income' developing countries were able to borrow more per capita than poorer countries. Using data from 1980 for a cross-section of seventy countries, we show that for each percentage point increase in per capita income, per capita external debt to private creditors tends to rise significantly more than one percent.
Moreover, this relation between external debt and national income tends to hold across countries within the same region (Africa, Asia, and Latin America) .
Our ala is to provide a natural explanation of this evidence which is also consistent with the well-documented positive relationship between capital market development and growth (Goldsmith (1969) and Mckinnon (1973) 1. The framework here stresses asymmetric information at the level of individual borrowers as a source of (endogenously-derived) frictions in world capital markets.1 A positive relation between external borrowing and the state of development can emerge because in wealthier countries firms are better capitalized. Informational problems consequently have less impact, resulting 1Our analysis draws on recent developments in the closed-economy literature on interactions between the real and financial sectors; see Gertler (1988) for a survey. To abstract from sovereign risk, we assume that there is a supranational legal authority, capable of enforcing contracts across borders. Hence our analysis is really as much a model of capital flows between Manhattan and the Bronx as between Japan and India. 1 in a lower cost difference between internal (to a firm) finance and external finance.
Thus even in a world of perfectly integrated capital markets, In which riskiess rates are equalized, marginal products of capital can differ across nations. An Important empirical Implication Is that the spread between borrowing and lending rates should be larger in poorer countries, which most development economists take as a stylized fact.
Section II of the paper presents some simple correlations between national income and borrowing. A small-country model Is presented in section ru and a two-country general equilibrium version is given in section IV. The two-country model yIelds an interesting new perspective on the classic transfer problem: The cost to a country of repaying a debt may exceed the face value of the debt, since the decline in wealth exacerbates the information-induced loan market inefficiencies. Also, a rise In capital market efficiency In the rich country can lead to a 'siphoning' of Investment funds from the poor country. In the conclusions, we discuss some possible alternative explanations for the positive relation between capital Inflows and domestic wealth.
II. External Debt and GNP for Developing Countries
In Table 1 , we present 1980 data on income and external borrowing for seventy developing countries, listed In order of GNP per capita The second column lists external debts owed to private lenders; the third column also includes debts owed to other governments and to multilateral credit agencies (e.g., the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank). A casual comparison of column one with either column two or three indicates a strong correlation between GNP and external borrowing. Table 2 contains two sets of regressions, both using the log of GNP per capita as the explanatory variable.
In the first, the dependent variable is the log of total external debt per capita. Over the entire sample 2, the coefficient on GNP was 1.05, with a standard error of .08. Separate regressions for Asia, Africa, and Latin America yield similar results.
One problem with using total external debt to measure country borrowing is that the component consisting of official (public) debt is probably best viewed as foreign aid. Whereas most official debt is senior in principle, it is junior to private debt in practice. Though technically, developing-country debtors have promptly repaid official debt, in most cases official creditors have made new loans in excess of any principal and Interest repayments due.
[See Bulow and Rogoff (1988) ].
In the second set of regressions reported in Table 2 , the dependent variable Includes only external debt owed to private creditors. Note that the coefficients are always larger than one and the difference Is significant over the full sample.3 Again, this simple relation explains a very large share of the variation In external borrowing across countries, and the coefficients are relatively stable across regimes.4 2Nepal, which had zero private debt per capita, had to be excluded when the regressions were run in logs. Because It is poor, Nepal's exclusion biases the estimated coefficients downwards.
3The results are quite robust to excluding trade credits and/or short term debt from the regressions. However, when "Micronesian" countries with populations under one million are included, the coefficients become smaller and the standard errors larger.
4We also ran a regression that included the growth rate of per capita GNF from 1980 to 1986 as a proxy for expected productivity change. The variable, however, was unimportant. One can also Interpret the regional regressions as a crude attempt to control for differences in expected productivity across countries -the idea being that, while technology may differ between Brazil and Nigeria, it is less likely to significantly differ between Brazil and Argentina. Obviously, it would be desirable to explore the dynamics of the We chose the year 1980 because after the debt crisis began In 1982, the correspondence between book value and the market value of loans becomes much weaker.5 There did not exist a secondary market for bank loans as of 1980, but most of the private loans were indexed to short-term interest rates. Thus any capital gains or losses would mainly have to involve sovereign risk. The fact that most debtor nations were still receiving new funds in 1980 suggests that expectations of default were still quite low. Almost all sovereign debt to private creditors is of equal priority (for a rationale see Bulow and Rogoff (1988) 
external debt-GNP relation more fully, but unfortunately short-term debt data for years prior to 1980 is suspect. 5However, the appendix presents similar regressions for the 1986 data, with similar results. 6Our results do not include direct investment, since including this would not be in the spirit of the asymmetric information model of section III. However, we note that for within Africa and Asia, direct investment was small relative to debt. For South America, it was somewhat larger, though still small relative to debt.
where c is her second-period consumption.
Entering period one, each person is endowed with W units of the consumption good.7 There exist two ways to convert this endowment into final period consumption. The first option is to lend abroad at the (gross) world riskiess interest rate r; the alternative is to Invest in a risky technology.
In particular, each person in the country has a project. All projects are identical cx ante, and yield cx post returns as follows: k units invested in period one yield 9 units of second-period output with probability i(k), and zero units with probability I -s(k). That is, ( 9 with probability n(k)
1-ir(k)
where y is second-period output. The function i(') is increasing, strictly concave and twice continuously differentiable, with w(O) 0, it(m) = 1, and r/9 < r'(O) < Thus, investment raises the probability that the individual's project will yield a high level of output, and the marginal expected return to investment is diminishing.9 We assume that output realizations are independent across the projects of different individuals.
If an individual wants to invest more than her endowment in her project, can include any future income which is collateralizable. The distinction between current and future endowment is not important here. It is important in the two-country case since the world equilibrium will depend on the total supply of current endowment; see below. 8(o) > ne is needed to guarantee that it is optimal to invest under perfect information.
It is not essential that '(0) be finite, but introducing this restriction makes the exposition a bit simpler.
91t is easy to generalize the results to a technology with a large set of possible output realizations. We choose the two-point distribution for ease of exposition. then she must raise funds from the world capital market; that is, W+bmk (3) where b is the amount she borrows. In return for this amount, she issues a state-contingent security which pays 2g in the event the project yields the good outcome, and in the event of the bad outcome. The security must offer 10 lenders the market rate of return r, so that
The left-hand side of (4) is the expected payment to lenders.
The individual's expected second period consumption is given by
where the last term is the individual's return from risk-free investments abroad, and the first two terms represent the expected net return on her project.
The information structure is as follows: Lenders may observe a borrower's initial wealth and the total amount she borrows. What the borrower does with the funds, however, is her private knowledge. In particular, she may secretly lend abroad rather than invest in her project. Whereas investment is unobservable, lenders can freely observe realized output. The production function n() is common knowledge.
If there were no information asymmetries, the individual would invest to the point where the expected marginal project return equals the world interest rate. Let k denote this first-best level of investment; thus 1°It is not necessary to assume that lenders are risk neutral, but only that idiosyncratic project risk be diversifiable in world capital markets. r (6) Under asymmetric information, however, it is not generally possible to implement the first best allocation because the borrower's choice of investment k is not verifiable.
Contracts can be conditioned only on realized output y, and not on k. Given any output-contingent payoffs (z, z specified by the contract, the borrower will pick k to maximize her expected consumption, given by (5). Thus she will equate her expected marginal gain from investing with her opportunity cost of (secretly) holding assets abroad12
So long as Z9 differs from Zb, k will differ from its first-best optimum value k", given by (6).
The problem is that the borrower's marginal benefit from investing depends not only on the marginal gain in expected output, but on the change in her expected obligation to lenders, as well. We will subsequently refer to (7) as the "incentive constraint."
If the borrower could promise lenders a fixed payment = r(k" -W) then (by (7)] she would invest the first best amount k. This is not feasible, however, since the project yields nothing in the bad state. Since the borrower's consumption must be non-negative, an important constraint on the form of the contract is
The incentive problem emerging here is classified as moral hazard because the informational asymmetry arises after contracting. See Dixit (1987) for an application to international trade.
12The analysis would be qualitatively similar if the borrower had the option of secretly consuming in period one instead of secretly lending abroad.
For the case where V < k the optimal incentive compatible contract Is found by choosing Zb. b, and k to maximize (5) subject to (3) (4) (7) and (8). The solution is as follows13: The contract pays lenders zero in the bad state, so that (8) Thus, in equilibrium, the borrower does not secretly lend abroad. Borrowing more than is essential to finance k would raise the gap between and 2b•
Since (3) and (5) hold with equality for the information-constrained case, one can use these equations to eliminate b and 2b from (4) and (7). The result is the following two equations, which determine k and --r,
Equation (9) is the incentive constraint, and is drawn as the curve IC In Figure 1 . It is downward sloping. A rise in Z5 lowers the borrower's expected marginal gain from investing and therefore must be offset by a decline in k. The curve Intersects the vertical axis at a value of Z9 which lies between zero and e (recall that ne < r'(0) < m). It intersects the horizontal axis at k since eq. (9) resembles eq. (6) when Z9 equals zero.
Equation (10) is the constraint that lenders must receive the market rate of 13 See the Appendix for details.
14The idea that Informational asymmetries can affect an individual firm's Investment strategies and financial structure originated with Jensen and Heckling (1976) . Investment in the information-constrained case must be below its first . best value k . The result that k < k follows immediately from a comparison of (6) and (9) mitigating the Incentive problem. Investment rises, in accordance with eq.(9). thus raising output as well.18
Now consider the link between external borrowing and country wealth.
15The slope of the MR curve equals [r/t(k)1[1 -Ø(k)(1 -W/k)]; where 0(k) is the ratio of the marginal product of capital to the average product, given by ir'(k)/(ir(k)/k). Since 0 < 0(k) < 1 and since W < k along the MR curve, the slope must be positive.
16Because the productivity risks are Independent across investment projects, and because the number of projects Is large, there is no aggregate risk.
17The result that increases in borrower net worth stimulate Investment when Informational problems are present is quite general; see Bernanke and Gertler (1989) . For some empirical support, see Fazzari, Hubbard and Petersen (1988) . 18 The effect of a change in W on k is given by = ir'(k)Z/L(ir"(k)/ir'(k))r Then, from differentiating eqs. (9) and (10), one obtains
External borrowing will rise with W if a dollar increase in wealth induces more than a dollar increase in investment. This will be the case if diminishing returns set in slowly, i.e., ir(k) is small relative to ir'(k). A corresponding result is that the spread between the marginal product of capital and the world riskless interest rate will vary across countries, and will in particular be larger the poorer the country. Note that cross-country differences in marginal products of capital may arise here even though the world capital market is perfectly integrated (the riskiess rate is the same 19 everywhere).
Finally, consider how changes in the world interest rate influence 19Thus our model is completely consistent with Frankel and MacArthur's (1988) finding that covered interest differentials are relatively small for many LDCs. investment. As r goes up, the IC curve shifts to the left. The borrower's opportunity cost of Investing rises, so for any given value of Z9, k must decline. The MR curve moves inward as well. Some combination of a rise in 2g and a fall in k is necessary for lenders to continue to receive a competitive return. The interest-elasticity of investment in the information-constrained case may or may not be greater than in the full information case. It is greater if > 0. This will likely be the case if the initial amount borrowed, k -W, is large or if the production function is sufficiently concave so that the decline in k is not enough to offset the 20 higher rate of interest. Table 1 represents more than a tiny fraction of the world's GNP. However, taken together, they are economically larger than Japan. Therefore, for some issues involving multi-lateral transfers of wealth (e.g., due to a global restructuring of Third World debt).
None of the countries listed in
it is of interest to analyze the general equilibrium implications of these nations' capital market activities.
IV. The Two-Country General Equilibrii Case
Suppose there are two countries of equal population size, country R ("rich") and country P ('poor"). In each country, a percent of the individuals are "entrepreneurs" and 1-u percent are "lenders." All individuals have the same utility function, given by equatIon (1). That is, 20The adjustment of k in response to a change in r is given by
where 25(r,k) = r(k -W)/ir(k), so that Z > 0 and < 0. Similarly, entrepreneurs and lenders in the rich country are endowed with and units, respectively. For the time being, the only restriction we need impose is titat w' < WR.
Each entrepreneur owns and manages a risky investment project. The project technology is the same across entrepreneurs and across countries, and is given by equation (2) above. As before, if an entrepreneur wants to Invest more than her endowment she has to borrow, so that equation (3) still applies.
Lenders do not have projects; their only option is to lend to entrepreneurs.
21
The information structure is the same as in the small country case.
Lenders observe a project's realized output, but cannot observe the capital input. They cannot directly see whether the entrepreneur is secretly lending to other entrepreneurs.
If there were no information asymmetries, the following three equations would characterize the world equilibrium:
where the P and R superscripts denote the countries, and the •'s denote the lenders, entrepreneurs would not be borrowers in the world general equilibrium.
22Note that entrepreneurs may secretly rechannel their investment funds either directly, or through a (zero-profit) intermediary.
full Information equilibrium. The main difference from the small country case is of course that the world Interest rate r is endogenous. It depends on technology and the total world endowment. Since the technologies are the P.
same, k equals k . Under perfect information, the pattern of investments Is independent of the pattern of endowments.
Under asymmetric information, the following five equations characterize the world equilibrium:
Equations (15) and (16) correspond to equation (9) for the small country case, and equations (17) and (18) correspond to equation (10). Equation (19) is the condition that the total demand for investment capital must equal the world supply, and is drawn as the negatively-sloped WV curve in Figure 2 . Investment In the poor country is now less than in the rich country.
Combining equations (15) (16) and (13), and noting that kR > kR. and that > 0. Thus lenders must be worse off under asymmetric information. Equation (20) [Inspection of eq. (20) IndIcates that r/8W5 > 0 since k declines and unchanged. I Entrepreneurs in the poor country lose rents as a result of the 23An important difference between our model and earlier frameworks emphasizin, capital market frictions (e.g., Persson and Svenson (1987) ) is that the Imperfections and the forms of the financial contracts are derived endogenously. An important exception Is Greenwood and Williamson (forthcoming) who develop a monetary model of International business fluctuations under Incomplete Information. Another related paper is Samolyk (1988) , who studies the transmission of regional disturbances in financial markets.
capital flight. This loss of rents Is aggravated by the rise in the world interest rate. Lenders In the poor country benefit from the rise in interest rates but as long as the poor country Is a net borrower, its national income must fall. 
).
The wealth transfer naturally imposes a direct cost on the poor country.
But there may be indirect costs as well. Holding constant the world interest rate, entrepreneurs in the poor country lose additionally because their project rents decline due to the reduction in investment. Thus, to the exter that the movement in the world interest rate is not large, the indirect effects always magnify the costs of the transfer. If the change in the interest rate is large (owing to highly concave production functions) then tt exact effect on the poor country's national income depends on whether it is net debtor or creditor in the world capital market. However, if the poor country is small, the movement in r Is negligible so that the capital market problems always magnify the costs of wealth transfers.
This model accordingly produces a transfer" problem in the sense that the cost to a country of paying a foreign debt may exceed the face value of the payments. Here the transfer problem relates to intertemporal trade rathe than contemporaneous trade, as in the classic debate between Keynes and Ohlin
It arises because the distribution of wealth affects the allocation of investment, due to information asymmetries.
As another variation on this theme, consider a shock which increases the initial endowment of all Individuals in the rich country, thus Increasing the total supply of Investment funds available to the world capital market.
Under perfect Information, capital investment would rise the same In each country. But under asymmetric Information, there will be a siphoning effect since the wealth of rich country entrepreneurs rises as well. Thus the increase In investment will be greater in the rich country, and It is even conceivable that investment may decline In the poor country.
Note that In a dynamic context, the relevant measure of a borrower's wealth, W, includes not only lIquId assets, but any collaterallzable expected future profits as well.25 Thus good news about future business conditions In 25 See Gertler (1988) , who studies a closed economy with repeated production and asymmetrIc information where entrepreneurs enter long-term financial the rich country can also induce the slphoning effect described above.
Finally, we consider a shock to world productivity, 8. By inspection of of equation (20). we see that a world productivity shock has no effect on the The Marshall-Romer model of growth under increasing returns to scale yields a very different rationale for why the Income elasticity of external borrowing might exceed unity (Romer (1989) ]. One testable difference between the Marshall-Romer model and the one developed here is that our contracts with lenders.
26See Bulow and Rogoff (1989) . or Fernandez and Rosenthal (1988) .
27The model of Atkeson (1988) 
Recall that k Is the first best level of capital Investment, given by 
1 + a'(k3)(k3-W3)/a(k') so that p<0andp>0.
Initially we assume that world wealth is held constant at .l (think of the experiments as being wealth redistributions) so that (B4) temporarily replaces (82):
where is a fixed number. Then, Next note that national income per capita for country J, y3, is given by a 4z(lr(k)e -r(kw')j + (l-)rW, -(k)e + r((xW + (l_a))W3L) -ak] (B7)
Using the previous results in conjunction with (87) 
